The death of Zarqawi, while not a time for celebration, is certainly in the camp of Good Things. We must remember, however, that he was but a prop used by the Bush administration to increase domestic fear, distract the public (Osama!) from the real bad guys they couldn’t get, a justification for their own failures, and as a straw man for their delusions. I haven’t blogged on Zarqawi’s death because there’s not much to say; he was a criminal figurehead, had few ties with al Qaeda, was not all that powerful in Iraq, did not work well with others, and was no good in the field. He’s a bit player puffed up by the Bushies to be a big thing.

Unlike, you know, Osama bin Laden.

Anyway, I didn’t feel I had anything to add on the issue that wasn’t already covered by other bloggers. But The Atlantic just published a wonderful article titled The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi that is well worth a look. Even if much of the information is old, it never hurts to repeat the truth when combatting the propaganda.

Of note is not only his background precis:

Everyone I spoke with readily acknowledged that as a teenager al-Zarqawi had been a bully and a thug, a bootlegger and a heavy drinker, and even, allegedly, a pimp in Zarqa’s underworld. He was disruptive, constantly involved in brawls. When he was fifteen (according to his police record, about which I had been briefed in Amman), he participated in a robbery of a relative’s home, during which the relative was killed. Two years later, a year shy of graduation, he had dropped out of school. Then, in 1989, at the age of twenty-three, he traveled to Afghanistan.

What the Jordanians think

“If you want to understand who Zarqawi is,” a former Jordanian intelligence official had told me earlier, “you’ve got to understand the four major turning points in his life: his first trip to Afghanistan; then the prison years [from 1993 to 1999]; then his return to Afghanistan, when he really came into his own; and then Iraq.” He thought for a moment. “And, of course, the creativity of the Americans.”

And, finally, how he was a useful prop for Bush, first as a justification for the illegal, elective war he wanted, then as a bogeyman, and finally as a last, desperate attempt to boost his 33% approval rating (I’m editorializing and rephrasing, of course. Ms. Weaver does not say so directly and in any event it would be outside the scope of the article).

During my time in Jordan, I asked a number of officials what they considered to be the most curious aspect of the relationship between the U.S. and al-Zarqawi, other than the fact that the Bush administration had inflated him.

One of them said, “The six times you could have killed Zarqawi, and you didn’t.”

When Powell addressed the United Nations, he discussed the Ansar al-Islam camp near Khurmal, in northern Kurdistan, which he claimed was producing ricin and where al-Zarqawi was then based. On at least three occasions, between mid-2002 and the invasion of Iraq the following March, the Pentagon presented plans to the White House to destroy the Khurmal camp, according to a report published by TheWall Street Journal in October 2004. The White House either declined or simply ignored the request.

More recently, three times during the past year, the Jordanian intelligence service, which has a close liaison relationship with the CIA, provided the United States with information on al-Zarqawi’s whereabouts—first in Mosul, then in Ramadi. Each time, the Americans arrived too late.

As Wolcott says, the Jordanians were practically tearing their rotator cuffs trying to point out where Zarqawi was, and we would not listen.

So the 3rd season of the Al-Zarqawi Show ended with the protagonist being offed, and all I can wonder is … who’s going to be the star of the new show (just don’t mention Osama!)

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